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Abstract 
This paper explores fraudulent acts by offenders who target and pressurize older adults ‘on 
the doorstep’ to have property repairs, often misrepresenting themselves as skilled 
tradesmen, and overcharging for such work. It uses extensive documentary materials from 
11 enforcement operations in England together with interviews with trading standards 
officers and financial investigators. Using Reiner’s (2000) Necessary Conditions of Crime 
framework illustrates the dynamics of doorstep fraud – from ‘low-value’ crimes to incidents 
of grooming and repeated victimization to the actions of organized crime groups often 
involving money laundering. The paper’s contribution is a focus on a relatively 
understudied but vulnerable demographic group in criminology, and in highlighting the 
investigation practices of non-constabulary law enforcement officers who have not been the 
subject of empirical study in criminology. 
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Introduction 
A videoed interview of Rita, an 89-yr old white woman shows a physically frail woman, 
apprehensive, frequently tugging at her cardigan sleeves, initially asking the police officers, 
'Have you come to see if I’ve been up to any mischief?' The bespectacled woman sits in an 
old-fashioned armchair, her eyes darting around the room, which reveals a patterned carpet, 
chintz wallpaper, and an antique cabinet in the corner. Throughout the short interview, Rita 
laughs nervously, twice telling officers that she cannot remember as her brain is 'squashed', 
and plaintively asking whether her answers have sent the officers mad. Rita cannot recall 
whether she had asked the offenders to clean her gutters or trim her hedges nor who had 
recommended these traders. Rita does, however, grasp the intent of the officers, telling 
them, ‘they came one day and they were doing and they got up and they were doing along 
the gutters at the top of the house. I went out to have a look to see what they were doing, 
they’d been there about five minutes, and they got off the other end and they said they’d 
finished and it was the length of the house and they couldn’t do it five 
minutes…[Responding to a question Rita repeats] ‘What did they ask for?’ [long pause] 
‘They did ask for something...I don’t know whether it was forty or sixty pounds...I gave 
them some money.’  
 
Rita is far from the competent witness that prosecutors1  and courts appreciate; nor does she 
fit the profile of younger victims on primetime television programmes such as Rogue Traders 
(BBC1) and Cowboy Builders (Channel 5), which provide high entertainment value and, 
perhaps necessarily, happy endings. Such programmes show spirited TV presenters who 
locate and trap offenders who have displayed poor workmanship or engaged in bogus or 
unscrupulous trading practices, having been captured on film using hidden cameras. 
Instead of 'cowboy builders' riding off romantically into the sunset after a dishonest day's 
work, they are corralled into suburban cul-de-sacs in their white vans, held to account, and 
                                                     
1 The CPS (2008) has published a Public Policy Statement: Prosecuting Crimes against Older People with 
details of support for them as victims and witnesses. 
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named and shamed on national television. The ‘reality’ of doorstep fraud, the focus of this 
paper, is, inevitably, much more mundane and more harmful in its outcome. Its detection 
and investigation tends to be by local authority trading standards officers, sometimes with 
police involvement. This work is carried out alongside the investigation of misleading, 
reckless, and aggressive trading practices under the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations (CPUTR) 2008. This complements the work of financial investigators 
who sometimes use the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to provide financial recompense for 
victims. For these enforcement professionals, Rita’s cognitive deficiencies are commonplace. 
It is victims’ lack of awareness and understanding of their victimisation which makes this 
crime type relatively ‘invisible’ (Davies et al. , 2014). Its ‘invisibility’ means that there are no 
credible official statistics on this particular form of fraud, a broader category of offences, 
which collectively havec not been well-covered by national crime surveys2, so we know little 
of this fraud's prevalence, incidence, dynamics, and impact (Button et al. , 2013, Levi, 2008a, 
Sutton, 2007 but see Andrews, 2014)3. Finally, it is worth noting, as does Levi (2008a), that 
despite the claimed globalization of crime, doorstep fraud is a surprisingly local and, at 
most, cross-regional crime, and one which like many other frauds is not high on public 
policing agendas (Button et al. , 2007).  
 
This paper is concerned with the least frequently victimised demographic group in official 
crime statistics yet those who face heightened risk in relation to doorstep fraud: older adults. 
While recognized as at risk of domestic abuse and neglect by relatives and care staff (Biggs et 
al. , 2009, Brogden & Nijhar, 2011, Giordano & Giordano, 1984), such work has been rarely 
informed by criminological theory (Payne, 2011), and little has been said about other forms 
of victimization4. Thornton et al.s (2005) scaled-up estimates of distraction burglary among 
older adults are 400,000 attempts, of which 130,000 are successful. Similar to doorstep fraud 
it involves offenders misrepresenting themselves as, for example, a utilities company 
employee to gain access for the purposes of theft. Older adults are among those groups 
South (2014: viii) rightly regards as 'socially invisible, marginalised or forgotten' in 
criminological research. This paper, in beginning to rectify this, presents an illustration of 
the spectrum of doorstep fraud offences from the ‘low-value’ victimization of older adults 
like Rita, to incidents constituting repeated victimization and sometimes grooming by 
offenders to, at the most serious end, the predation on older adults of organized crime 
groups. The second purpose of this paper is to illustrate the enforcement activities of trading 
standards officers who as non-constabulary law enforcement agents have only rarely been 
the subject of scrutiny within criminology (but see Button & John, 2002, Vagg, 1995). This is 
despite their long history of 'public policing' and their investigative repertoires drawing on 
much that is familiar to the police investigation of crime, as policing scholars have noted 
(Johnston, 1992, Jones & Newburn, 2006).  
 
 
 
                                                     
2 ONS is introducing fraud questions into the Crime Survey of England and Wales in April 2016.  
3 Andrews’ (2014) estimated 11,500 incidents of doorstep crime (including fraud) being reported to 
trading standards departments in England annually, with reporting rates estimated at 10-20%. 
Offences can also be reported to the police and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. Action Fraud 
recorded 5,671 offences involving doorstep crime in 2013/14 (ONS, 2015).  
4 Several third sector organisations like Age UK, Think Jessica, Citizens Advice, have produced 
materials to publicise the dangers of fraud for older adults. 
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Methodological Approach 
This paper draws on documentary sources from 11 enforcement operations involving 41 
offenders and 140 victims undertaken between 2006 and 2014 by a trading standards 
department in one proactive local authority in England, referred to as the pseudonym of 
Newmontshire. Four of the 11 operations included in the sample were scored on the 
National Organised Crime Group Model (OCGM) matrix and assigned a tiered operational 
response. Detailed information was collated from case files which variously included: victim 
interview transcripts and statements; CCTV and surveillance evidence; statements from 
relatives, neighbours, GPs, carers, professional traders (e.g. arboriculturists), surveyors, 
bank, building society and Post Office staff;  offenders' mobile phone and Facebook records; 
trade advertising flyers and receipt books; photographs of offenders' clothes and vehicles; 
bank statements, tax and credit status reports; as well as other evidence and intelligence 
such as cash seizures, victim cheque stubs, Police National Computer checks, intelligence 
entries, and records from the national case management system used for Trading Standards 
incident reporting and investigation management. As prosecutions for trading-related 
criminal offences are taken by local authority legal officers or private counsel rather than the 
CPS, case files included details of hearings, briefs for counsel, defence statements, notices to 
introduce hearsay evidence, applications for special measures for vulnerable witnesses, 
indictments laid, trading standards staff timesheets for calculations of legal costs, letters to 
defence solicitors, and Schedules of Non-Sensitive Material.  
 
The analysis of institutional records and other documents is  relatively common among 
crime historians (Godfrey, 2012) and has been used by other criminologists.  Polk (1994), for 
example, used coroners' and police records, and prosecution briefs, to establish typologies of 
masculine homicide, Dugato et al. (2015) provided a picture of Italian organized crime using 
confiscated property data and the Mafia Presence Index, and Moreselli and Roy (2008) 
studied social networks in car ringing operations using two years of police interrogation 
transcripts, affidavits, and surveillance evidence. While providing a potentially rich data 
source, this approach has its limitations. Such data can suffer validity problems because they 
reveal only those victims, suspects, witnesses, and 'primary facts' deemed by police officers 
and the like to be worthy of evaluation and investigation (McConville et al. , 1991: 87). There 
is considerable discretion exercised in such selection processes which may not be discernable 
from documentary sources. The possibility of investigative biases means they cannot be 
used to detail prevalence, incidence, or offender characteristics in a way victimization 
surveys can. 
 
Furthermore, the operations in this study's sample were atypical in that the high prosecution 
rate for Newmontshire cases was not representative of trading standards departments 
nationally; Andrews (2014) survey of 157/166 trading standards departments estimated a 
prosecution rate of 1% of reported incidents in 2013/14. Undoubtedly, in part, the low 
prosecution rate reflects regulatory agencies' tendency to rely on education, advice, and 
negotiation to gain compliance with the law rather than prosecution and sanctions, although 
enforcement strategies are subject to local variation (Hutter, 1988, Tombs, 2016). 
Notwithstanding, the operations comprised similar offences of aggressive trading practices, 
misrepresentation, and overcharging to those reported and recorded (n=53) in 
Newmontshire's incident management system in 2013/145.  
 
                                                     
5 A further 228 incidents were recorded which included attempts and criminal trading offences under 
the CPUTR 2008. 
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Additionally, seven semi-structured interviews examining emerging themes from the 
documentary material were conducted in Newmontshire, Marningford, and Englestead 
(also pseudonyms), with a financial investigator and six experienced trading standards 
officers, two of whom had previously worked as financial investigators. The interviews were 
carried out between August 2014 and December 2014, and lasted between 83 and 227 
minutes. Interviewees were selected for their experience of doorstep fraud investigations, so 
once again, they are not representative of trading standards officers nationally. 
 
The Necessary Conditions of Doorstep Fraud: Illustrative Examples  
Criminology is divided as to what its focus should be: offenders for proponents of 
dispositional theories concerned with offender motivation (Young, 1994) or crime events or 
criminal action in theories of choice, control, and crime science (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 
Felson & Bora, 2010, Laycock, 2003). To outline the particular dynamics of doorstep fraud 
this paper uses Reiner's (2000) framework which draws on elements of both approaches in 
referring to the five necessary conditions of crime which can vary across time and space. 
These are: labelling and constructions of what is criminal; offender motivations; the means 
and resources available to offenders; the opportunities presented; and the degree and nature 
of formal and informal social controls.  
 
Labelling 
Labelling can be by victims and their advocates, enforcers, or offenders. The interviewees 
consistently referred to doorstep fraud investigations as being a relatively recent 
development, which in Newmontshire Trading Standards had originated with exposure to 
the work of retired Detective Chief Superintendent Brian Steele who was part of the Leeds 
Distraction Burglary Initiative team in the early 2000s (Steele et al. , 2001). Notwithstanding, 
Luke, a senior enforcement officer in Newmontshire recognized that previously some such 
offences would have been prosecuted under the old Trades Descriptions Act 1968, 'prior to 
bringing it all together and labelling it, understanding more of what doorstep crime was'.  
 
The presence of primetime television programmes described earlier suggests public 
perceptions of doorstep fraud recognise it as unambiguously criminal. In fact, offenders 
themselves may regard offending against older adults as unconscionable and lacking 
criminal status. Taylor’s (2014: 495) study of 29 burglars found a consensus with distraction 
burglaries of older adults being variously described as ‘disgusting’, ‘wrong’, ‘sick’, and 
‘twisted’, at the bottom of the moral hierarchy of acceptable burgling behaviour.  
 
For the labelling of the behavior as crime by victims they must perceive themselves to have 
been victimized. The following examples illustrate the ambivalent and contingent nature of 
this process. In 2012, Newmontshire received a report from the carer of Maurice, a 60 year 
old man who was suffering from a progressive neurological condition, claiming that he had 
been groomed over a period of four years, with offenders visiting him at home and taking 
him out for meals and to medical appointments. The principal offender was in his mid-40s 
and had met Maurice when touting for business as a uPVC installer. When video-
interviewed, Maurice recalled at least 25 jobs undertaken at his property by the offender, his 
two sons, and another family member. Examples included being overcharged for replacing 
his garden gates, having his kitchen ceiling unnecessarily replastered, and the house rewired 
at excessive cost. An independent surveyor assessed some roofing work undertaken6: 
                                                     
6 Using regional versions of the Guide to Estimating for Small Works and Alterations & Refurbishment 
produced by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors Building Cost Information Service. 
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… only a single coat of treatment has been applied whereas the 
manufacturers will recommend a minimum of two coats…I have inspected 
many roofs applied with these coating systems and this is possibly the 
worst in regard to its quality of work and finish…whether such work was 
warranted is extremely doubtful in view of the age of this dwelling… 
In total, £58,715 of property repairs were carried out and Maurice had also lent the offenders 
£185,245 in loans and assumed legitimate investments. When first interviewed by trading 
standards officers, Maurice resisted the label of victim arguing later he had 'lots of money' 
and he 'liked to think he was helping somebody…his friend', perhaps trying to deflect the 
shame and stigma of the label of victim. Felix, a trading standards officer in Newmontshire, 
noted a shift in Maurice's attitude when he was left alone to digest the surveyor's report; as 
Walklate (2007) has observed, victims or 'survivors' can experience both agency and 
passivity at different moments in time. Likewise, Gemma, an enforcement officer in 
Marningford, reported similar experiences: 
We had to almost convince him [the victim] what had gone on, because he'd 
been befriended by them [offenders]… they were in his life for two years, 
and he felt that they were doing him a favour by helping him to stop his 
roof collapsing … we gave the example that he goes to Sainsbury's to do his 
shop, and we asked him how much it cost him every week. He said, ‘About 
£30 to £40.’ We said, ‘Right. What if you went and did your shop, and it cost 
you £100, but you'd bought exactly the same things? What would you say?’ 
He said, ‘I've been ripped off. I'd be angry.’ ‘Right, these are similar 
circumstances.’ So we tried to relate it to something to what he buys 
regularly… 
Motivation 
Undoubtedly, a strong motivation for doorstep fraud is money. Straightforwardly, older 
adults can be defrauded of money for building work which has not been completed. In one 
Newmontshire investigation, an offender had charged two victims £2,500 and £2,400 for 
roofing work which had not even been started. Overcharging for labour and materials was 
also common. First cold-called by a man who illegitimately claimed to be a subcontractor for 
a reputable local roofing company employed in the same street, a 73-old female victim had 
been persuaded by frequent phone calls and visits to part with five amounts totaling 
£15,223, plus £250 for a personal loan. Not completing work and overcharging can also be 
combined, so for example, between June 2009 and September 2011, £17,430 was paid in 24 
cheques by 84-year old Arthur to the principal offender who had also defrauded Rita (see 
Table 1). During his PACE7 interview, the offender reported that he had no business 
account, offered no invoices or guarantees, and he could not recall any details of the charges 
made as 'there was a lot of partying since then'. This feature ('life as party') is one commonly 
identified as being part of offenders' lifestyles in many acquisitive crimes (see for example 
Shover & Honaker, 2014).  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
It remains possible that the manipulation required to carry out deceptions brings its own 
non-monetary rewards of a successful con. Identity thieves, interviewed by Copes and 
Vieratis (2009, 2014) claimed, with pride, advanced social skills, intuition, and technical 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
7 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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knowledge, and such attributes could easily be seen as criminal talent. For Sutton (2007), 
understanding the 'seductions of crime', placed centre stage in cultural criminology, would 
inform us about the structural and interpersonal dynamics of ‘strangely neglected’ offences 
like fraud. Finally, the possibility that some doorstep offenders may themselves be victims 
of forced labour cannot be ruled out. Using human trafficking intelligence data from 17 
police forces, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (2013) observed that of 2255 victims in 
2012, 7% (n=156) worked in block paving, tarmacking and construction. 
  
Means 
For the successful commission of crime, Gill (2005), using Ekblom and Tilley's (2000) 
framework of 'core competencies', outlined seven resources which offenders use, with a 
degree of overlap between these. The first requires offenders to be able to handle emotional 
states such as having an insensitivity to risk. In Operation Topaz which is discussed in detail 
later in this paper, the offenders were arrested and then released on police bail with 
conditions prohibiting cold-calling, entering certain areas, and using vehicles other than 
public transport. But, as Anita, Head of Trading Standards Investigations at Newmontshire, 
remarked: 
….Literally within a week of the warrant they'd done another job [doorstep 
fraud]…They had a hundred officers on their premises, they'd lost [had 
seized by the police] all their vehicles, they'd all got restraint orders [had 
their bank accounts frozen], and within a week they were back up and 
running [using hired vehicles]…  
With regard to the second resource, doorstep offenders draw on personality resources, 
including guile, persuasiveness, and audacity. Becky, a trading standards manager in 
Engelstead described a man being duped by the offer of a free guttering cleaning service 
which required a space being cleared in his garden for ladder access. All the plants from his 
garden were removed and replaced with gravel, with £6,000 demanded for the work, which 
necessitated him taking out a £2,000 bank loan. The ruse of completing work without 
householders' consent is a pernicious one in that it raises an obligation to pay for services 
rendered but not solicited. Similarly, Luke, a senior enforcement officer in Newmontshire 
described an agoraphobic victim being pressured to go to a high street ATM with offenders, 
who when left alone was 'completely out of her depth… totally and utterly distraught.'  
 
Third, knowledge resources are likely used to identify suitable victims but evidence on this was 
largely anecdotal. Interviewees speculated that target cues – wheelchair ramps, handrails, 
unkempt gardens, peeling paintwork or frilly net curtains – could serve as cues for possible 
vulnerability.  Offenders may fish for information, what Barbara, a Newmontshire financial 
investigator called ‘assessing rip-offability, to ascertain whether there is any guardianship 
presence (Felson and Bora 2010), such as a partner, relative, or neighbour.  The scouring of 
obituaries to reveal the recently widowed, the buying of customer addresses from 
companies selling mobility aids, and the compilation and sharing of 'suckers' lists' among 
organised crime groups were all cited by interviewees as further possibilities. However, 
Anita, Head of Investigations at Newmontshire said: 
The only example we had of that was...the victim had been targeted for four 
years…[we] did a physical search of that house and found multiple invoices 
throughout the house from different traders…[there were] four, five, six 
different traders saying they’d all done the same work, so we arrested the 
last three and prosecuted them… the last three were members of a wider 
network of a family who’d clearly passed it [the victim's address] on 
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between them. 
Offenders may reckon on large sums of cash houses where there are elderly and 
housebound residents. Older adults may not be ordinarily suspicious of traders selling 
services door-to-door, as this was more common practice in the past. Offenders may also be 
aware of older adults' cognitive difficulties preventing the careful decision-making of 
consumers who seek quotes for works before committing to them.  
Fourth, skills-based resources such as understanding how to con convincingly is key. An older 
adult informed that not going ahead with work on their roof could lead to it collapsing, 
forcing them into residential care, operates as a powerful incentive to proceed.  Becky, in 
Engelstead, had a victim who refused to tell his adult daughter about his victimisation, not 
just because of the embarrassment and shame of being scammed, but because it might 
indicate he could no longer cope with independent living.  
 
The fifth resource identified by Gill (2005) concerned physical traits such as strength and size, 
easily demonstrated against older adults.  Katharine, a 76-year old woman, opened her door 
in November 2008 to a man who claimed to have seen a roof tile missing, and in her 
statement she said:  
I went back into the house leaving the [front] door locked behind me. I did 
not want the males to do the work...A few minutes later I was in the kitchen 
when one of the males opened the rear kitchen door and walked in...one 
said he had fixed the tile and I owed them £3,200. I was so shocked, I said I 
was a pensioner and did not have that kind of money. They wouldn’t give 
in to me not giving them the money. I felt vulnerable and intimidated and 
went upstairs to get my chequebook. 
An independent surveyor found the roof tile replacement should have cost only £18.00 plus 
VAT, as they had not even secured the mortar bedding of the tile.  
 
The sixth resource, tools or 'crime facilitators' are obviously important. The offenders who 
defrauded Katharine had trade flyers, business cards, magnetic signage on their vans, and 
sweatshirts emblazoned with their company insignia. Other props – ladders, spirit levels, 
invoices and receipt books - may be used to facilitate doorstep fraud. Indeed, a study of the 
88 victims of a home appliance repairman in Ohio, US, found it was the offender's large 
advertisement in Yellow Pages, his business cards, and work contract, which persuaded 
consumers of his authenticity (Vaughan & Carlo, 1975). As Sutton (2007: 254) reminds us, 
some offenders ‘regularly create an aura of legitimacy around criminal behaviour by 
merging it in their own minds and blurring it in the minds of other offenders with legal, 
ethical mercantile practices’.  
 
Finally, the seventh resource, of co-offenders and contacts, can be crucial in the completion of 
doorstep fraud, where significant physical work is undertaken, such as in block paving, or 
where others' bank accounts are required to launder the money.  
 
Opportunities 
In Cohen and Felson's  (1979) original formulation they hypothesized that routine activities 
provide the basis for criminal activities. One major social change they recognized was the 
under-occupation of homes as women moved into higher education and employment. This 
precipitated higher rates of household crime with reduced guardianship and more direct-
contact predatory crimes outside the home. Such reasoning could be applied to explain older 
adults' lower victimization risks, but this is turned on its head in doorstep fraud. For those 
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aged 65 and over, compared with other age groups, more time is spent asleep, taking meals, 
engaging in personal care, exercising free time, or doing domestic work, and these activities 
are more likely to occur in the home (Lader et al. , 2006).  
 
The 65s and over population increased between 1981 and 2008 from 7.9m to 9.9m 
(Falkingham et al. , 2010) as a result of rising life expectancy. The fastest growing age group 
were those aged 85 years and above, known by demographers as the 'oldest old', and 90 year 
olds and over are disproportionately female. Areas with the highest life expectancy, with 
few exceptions, are rural or suburban (Falkingham et al. 2010) where homes can include 
large gardens and driveways that require maintenance. Poor health, generally, and mobility 
difficulties and cognitive impairments such as confusion and memory disturbance in 
particular, are correlated with older age (Prince et al. , 2014). These can be linked to reduced 
social interaction with others (Burholt & Scharf, 2014), spousal bereavement and dislocation 
from family and friends following retirement, and increased rates of solo living, which may 
all increase victimization risks. These factors play a part in late modern experiences of 
loneliness and isolation, such that groomed victims like Maurice may perversely see being 
defrauded as worthwhile by dint of the human interaction it offers. These individuals can be 
easily pulled into what Burgard and Schlembah (2013) have termed 'strategic interaction', in 
which the offender detaches the victim from rational interaction, lowering their perception 
of possible danger. Together these social and demographic changes can be seen as 
presenting a proliferation of criminal opportunities for doorstep offenders. 
 
Controls 
For Reiner (2000), the absence of controls is the final condition which needs to be met for a 
crime to occur. As previously mentioned, formal controls, through law enforcement are not 
widely practised. Trading standards officers, like other regulatory agents such as 
environmental health officers aim, at least initially, for co-operative compliance with the law 
through persuasion (Hutter, 1988) and, as Levi (2008b) has noted, they are predisposed to 
offer advice and warnings to errant traders. The principal offender in Rita and Arthur's case 
referred to the ineffectiveness of this during interview, wryly remarking that 'it does come in 
that ear and went out that ear with Trading Standards'.  
 
The political context will also influence enforcement approaches as operational priorities 
will be determined through negotiation between senior officers and local councillors, 
although protecting the public from 'rogue traders' appears to have a high stated priority in 
many areas (Raine et al. 2015). Recent cuts in trading standards budgets, estimated by Raine 
et al. (2015) to be upwards of 20% in 2014/15 compared with 2011/12, combined with pre-
austerity cuts, will also have severely limited intervention possibilities, and the same is 
likely to be true of the police, particularly given stringent performance targets being in place 
in recent times (Collier, 2002, FitzGerald et al. , 2002). Here, Anita's reaction to government 
presumptions of effective joint-agency working are dismissed in light of current resource 
constraints: 
at the Home Office seminar yesterday they were all talking about this whole 
utopia of joint agency jobs and we’d go to the police and say can you help 
us with this job and then the police come and say yeah can you help us with 
this job.  That’s just not what happens. We’re bottom of the pile with these 
jobs in reality because of all the drug stuff goes above us… [or] firearm 
issues you know, counter terrorism issues that have all taken priority… it’s 
just like yeah, go away get to the back of the queue kind of attitude really.  
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The interviewees also noted that police intervention may be thwarted by a mistaken belief 
that doorstep fraud constitutes civil rather than criminal offences and are therefore outside 
police jurisdiction. Gemma, from Marningford Trading Standards, for example, described 
how a 'job' comprising witness statements, a surveyor's report and detailed offence outlines, 
had been rejected by her local police force as a civil matter, leaving her with 'the gist that 
they didn't want to deal with it'. While there is a hint here that for the crime-fighting police 
officer, stopping a 'rogue trader' does not quite cut it, it is just as possible that this reflects 
legal misunderstanding, or a reluctance to expend resources on what is regarded as core 
Trading Standards business (Doig & Levi 2009).  
   
The role of informal social control in offenders’ lives through the family, school, and 
community is unexplored in relation to doorstep fraud. Notwithstanding, several 
interviewees surmised that doorstep offending was often carried out by family members 
and such attachments may exacerbate propensities to commit crime rather than obviate 
them:  
You know fathers have done it, families have done it, they will tell me 
during interview…’I’ve gone out with uncles’…worked with them from a 
very early age and then, then they’ve gone off to do it themselves… I would 
have to say it’s learned experiences and philosophies and, and passing it on. 
(Luke, Senior Enforcement Officer, Newmontshire) 
 
The Investigative Repertoires of Trading Standards 
The interviews with trading standards officers and financial investigators revealed a pro-
prosecution, crime control orientation in doorstep fraud cases where the evidence was 
sufficient to prosecute (see also McConville et al. 1991), which contrasts with perceptions of 
Trading Standards as being largely compliance-oriented (but see also Hutter, 1988). This 
revealed utilitarian objectives of deterrence and incapacitation, with the aim of protecting 
older adults from future victimization, even though the efficacy of such approaches has, of 
course, been challenged (Bottoms & von Hirsch, 2010, Hough et al. , 2013).  
 
Like other fraud investigations which have low detection rates (Levi, 2008b, McKee, 2014), 
doorstep fraud investigations are usually reactive and case-based8, and as in other crime 
investigations they are dependent on witnesses, forensic evidence, intelligence, and 
surveillance of suspects' movements and financial dealings (Maguire, 2003). Securing robust 
witness testimony can be difficult. As the introduction to this paper made clear, victim 
accounts may be incoherent, lacking convincing information regarding the timing of 
offences, or specific details of interactions with offenders. Trading standards officers in 
Newmontshire had made considerable efforts to understand the nature of older adults' 
cognitive impairments in order to gather reliable evidence sensitively. Felix, a senior officer, 
had received training in interviewing vulnerable individuals from the police and noted: 
it’s completely different to doing a suspect…with a vulnerable person you, 
you certainly have to…let them talk to you about something they want to 
talk to you about… I’ll be doing my, what’s classed as 'bubbles' all the way 
through so…anything relevant that she writes, that she says to me, I’ll put 
like a, a circle, with that, that word into it, and then once she’s finished 
                                                     
8 Around the country there are various specialist fraud teams which work more proactively e.g. 
Operation Manhunt within Hertfordshire Constabulary, which provides crime prevention advice on 
how to deal with bogus callers who are involved in distraction burglary and fraud.  
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completely I’ll ask her to try and remember again and just keep going 
through it. Don’t, don’t stop her or, try and quicken it all up, just get to the 
end…say right you mentioned a van turned up, and a man came to your 
door, and then we’ll talk the van, we’ll talk about the man, we’ll talk about 
what he said, and then we’ll go onto the man and then we’ll talk about what 
he looks like… 
With Maurice who had been a victim of fraud in relation to both work on his house and a 
bogus business investment, Felix recalled the painstaking days of investigation with usually 
only a 90 minute window in the morning each day when he was able to concentrate and not 
be too tired from his high dosage medication. Maurice was visited every other day for a 
period of months to gather as much information as possible about his repeated 
victimisation. 
 
Neighbours frequently served as witnesses and in Rita’s case two had followed the 
offenders in their vehicles and recorded their car’s registration plate. Where such strong 
neighbourly relations exist, this lends itself to a cocoon watch approach (Forrester et al. , 
1988) - where neighbours are co-opted to watch out for and report any suspicious activity in 
a small housing area (but see Gorden & Buchanan, 2013). There is also a preventive role for 
financial services staff, either those tasked with identifying and monitoring any suspicious 
account transactions and filing reports to the National Crime Agency or those working in 
customer service: 
if you know that the little old lady comes in every Friday and draws out £50 
for groceries… and suddenly she’s coming in ‘Oh how much cash can I 
get?'… [counter staff] should be starting to say ‘Oh have you booked a 
holiday or oh what are you doing with this money?’… Where did you find 
out about this workman having knocked on your door? (Barbara, Financial 
Investigator, Newmontshire Trading Standards) 
Letters from GPs littered the case files, attesting to memory disturbances, medications 
prescribed, the likelihood of distress if court attendance was required, and these were 
frequently used in hearsay evidence applications or for special measures such as video-
interviews as was used in Rita’s case. 
 
While police investigators are often assisted by admissions of guilt in interview, trading 
standards officers more frequently face uncooperative doorstep fraud suspects who 
typically offer 'no comment' interviews (cf. Maguire 2003). Prosecutions are therefore only 
viable if there is sufficient other evidence and intelligence available. Such 'information work' 
(Innes, 2007) is the backbone of doorstep fraud investigations which involve piecing 
together and collating multiple sources to buttress a victim narrative. As Trading Standards 
use the 5x5x5 system from the police National Intelligence Model (NIM), various police and 
trading standards intelligence and case management systems were available for officers to 
use in building cases9.   
 
Given  that fingerprint evidence is unlikely to be subject to misidentification (Newburn et al. 
, 2007), business cards, flyers, invoices, receipts, cheques, bankers' drafts, and even cash 
were routinely sent for fingerprint analysis. On occasion, handwriting analysis on, for 
example, invoices, would be used to link offenders to particular victims. Offenders’ mobile 
phone records and Facebook accounts would link them to co-conspirators with the former 
                                                     
9 Including from Operation Liberal which is the national intelligence unit for distraction burglary. 
11 
 
establishing contacts to particular victims. Photographic evidence formed a significant 
proportion of evidential material, drawn from independent surveyors’ reports or from other 
expert witnesses such as tree surgeons and arboculturists (see also Table 2 below). In the 
case of Arthur, Anita and colleagues, used his estate agent's details and homebuyer’s survey 
from 1997 alongside Google Earth and Street View images to document the presence and 
absence of trees on his property, to show one had been removed fully two months before a 
cheque payment to the principal offender who claimed payment for its removal.  
 
ATM receipts where victims had been coercively escorted by offenders to local banks 
enabled officers to isolate the times when offenders' vehicles could be viewed on the banks’ 
CCTV footage, often providing a car registration plate, and sometimes facial images of 
offenders. Mapping offenders’ movements in time and space was also sometimes possible 
through carefully examining their financial transactions and other evidence:  
There's so many bits of information all over the place and it’s knowing 
where to look, and then sort of build up the picture. …I can tell what time 
the cheque was banked. And it might be that in the lady's [victim’s] diary 
she might have put the day before, 'Gardener coming at 10 in the morning 
to collect money’… maybe a witness of another victim said, 'Saw the van 
outside at 11:30, I know it was this time because I just finished watching 
daytime TV'… And then you've got the [Automatic Name Plate Recognition 
(ANPR)] information from Roman Bridge …they've been there at that time. 
You've got petrol here, you've topped up your phone there…(Barbara, 
Financial Investigator, Newmontshire Trading Standards) 
Financial investigators can often access six years of offenders’ bank statements which will be 
the starting point for identifying patterns of repeat victimization not recalled by a particular 
victim or further victims who have been unaware of, or have not wished to report, their 
victimisation. Credit card, mortgage application forms, and the like, often reveal offenders' 
mothers' maiden names, which can help to track money laundered through fictitious or 
family members’ accounts. Details of tax credits or income tax payments, or more commonly 
their absence in HMRC records, can undermine offenders' claims of trading legitimately. 
 
Doorstep offenders, like any others, adapt their offending when there is a perceived risk of 
detection.  Barbara, Newmontshire’s financial investigator, who described herself as a 
'hungry investigator' who 'loved adding all the pieces of the jigsaw together', judged 
suspects’ ‘asset-richness’ early on in her investigations by considering criminal lifestyle 
based on financial transactions relating to expensive property, vehicles, holidays, jewellery 
and patterns of regular eating out at restaurants. If convinced that suspects had benefitted 
financially from criminal conduct and these funds might be dissipated by offenders to avoid 
confiscation post-conviction, restraint orders would be applied for to freeze suspects’ bank 
accounts. In response, offenders typically recruited launderers to cash their cheques. Becky, 
a trading standards manager in Englestead, recalled one case where 12 launderers had been 
identified; 15 cheques had been laundered through one of the accounts totalling £71,450, 
with each cheque earning a £50 fee paid by the offenders.  
 
Operation Topaz: a Case Study of an Organised Crime Group (The Harper Family)  
'There's loads of twists and turns in this case…just the scale of it was massive. I worked on 
this case every day, all day, for about eighteen months' (Barbara, Financial Investigator, 
Newmontshire). 
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Below is a descriptive account of one of the four operations in this sample which were 
scored on the National Organised Crime Group Model (OCGM) matrix. It illuminates the 
dynamics of doorstep fraud, its cross-regional dimensions, and the vast array of evidence 
and intelligence required to support a prosecution case. It is an illustration of plural policing 
in action (Jones & Newburn, 1998), of joint agency working between  the police and trading 
standards which, according to Doig and Levi (2009) is a common feature of fraud 
investigation. This was necessitated by the large number of victims, the need for covert 
surveillance expertise, and for swift arrests at multiple sites on the Day of Action. The 69 
indictments laid were against a married couple, Hugh and Davina Harper, two of their adult 
sons, Darren and Harry, and a brother and a friend of Hugh’s. The offences included: 
dishonestly overcharging for work; dishonestly and falsely representing either expressly or 
by implication that they were competent or skilled tree surgeons; dishonestly undertaking 
unnecessary work; dishonestly and falsely representing a price to undertake gardening 
work and then demanding more money; and converting criminal property as a result of 
fraud into cash. Three other family members were similarly charged and convicted of eight 
money laundering offences.  
 
Newmontshire’s Trading Standards department became involved when it received a police 
referral regarding an elderly woman who had paid £2,600 for the minimal trimming of her 
garden shrubs. Although the Rapid Response team deployed did not find the offenders at 
her address, the payment by bankers' draft meant that the suspect was easily traceable. 
Coincidentally, the police had released an intelligence report about an illegal encampment 
where vehicles had been seen which had signage on them advertising gardening services 
and where there had been a large mound of gardening waste. From this it was possible to 
identify a magnolia tree and a variegated euonymus shrub which the victim had felt 
pressured to have removed. A second victim emerged who had been excessively charged 
£1,500 for tree pruning; she came forward only at the insistence of a relative who was a 
serving police officer. 
 
The recipient of the bankers' draft was Davina Harper who had previous related 
convictions, as did her husband, Hugh. An ANPR marker on the offenders' vehicle located 
them and they were arrested, their vehicle was seized, and restraint orders were placed on 
their bank accounts which had received funds from the two victims. The case then gathered 
momentum: 
…. it just goes whoosh because you just start doing the FI  [financial 
investigation] enquiries and we immediately found several accounts with 
massive amounts of money going through them and it was quite obvious at 
that point that they're gonna be multiple victims all over the place, basically. 
(Anita, Head of Investigations, Newmontshire) 
Over 90 victims were uncovered in ten counties across England and Scotland. A Major 
Incident Team of 30 detectives was tasked to undertake the vulnerable victim interviews 
with those identified from the financial investigation. The timing of the Day of Action was 
precipitated by the covert surveillance team identifying ongoing offending which raised 
immediate safeguarding concerns. One hundred officers undertook the arrests of the main 
suspects and seized property, other evidence and assets. Table 2 overleaf provides a vivid 
sense of the scale of this investigation, both in terms of police and trading standards officer 
involvement, and the volume and range of evidentiary exhibits which were prepared in 
readiness for a prosecution. The lengthy participation of Newmontshire’s financial 
investigator, previously referred to, was explained by the sheer number of cheques subject 
to production orders and then scrutiny.   
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
As in any investigation, lucky breaks are necessary. Accessing the CPS files for the earlier 
convictions of Hugh Harper in two neighbouring counties, brought to light two 'little black 
books' of victim names and addresses, showing that some Topaz victims had previously 
been targeted by the Harpers.  Anita, Head of Investigations, recalled in one entry: 
…there was a note saying, effectively saying, leave it for a couple of years. 
Cos her dementia will deteriorate by then, and he [Hugh Harper] had. By 
the time we had investigated it [as part of Operation Topaz], he had gone 
back and targeted her and had money out of her.  
In relation to another, blind victim, a neighbor had poor quality video footage of the suspect 
Hugh Harper. His identity was subsequently confirmed using facial recognition software 
which matched his body dimensions in the video stills with one of the seized T-shirts which 
had on it one of the eight business names under which his family traded. This showed 
unequivocally that Hugh Harper had been to the victim's house.  Similarly, the bank CCTV 
evidence proved crucial in demonstrating the conspiracy elements of the offence which can 
be particularly difficult in fraud investigations (see also Maguire, 2003 in relation to 'legal 
intent'):  
… we were able to pick out key footage. What that helped to do was show 
was well, Darren might take a cheque for Davina and might pay it in. Or 
Hugh might take a cheque and then Harry goes and pays it in. It was all 
about establishing the conspiracy and everyone's little role in it. (Anita, 
Head of Investigations, Newmontshire) 
The challenges of interviewing vulnerable older adults was a feature of Operation Topaz 
too, and in some cases victims had since died, others had become too ill to assist, or they 
refused to co-operate, particularly if they denied their victimisation. Overall, 40 required 
hearsay and special measures applications to be made because of unfitness due to cognitive 
impairments, ill-health, or frailty. The large number of interviews carried out with the 
Harper family and other suspects included re-interviews when further repeat victims came 
to light from the financial investigation. This reflected a deliberate attempt to maximize the 
possibilities of incapacitation on conviction; because ‘they won't stop until they're locked 
up', was how Anita put it in interview. Custodial sentences were imposed on the adult 
offenders ranging from 16 months to 7 years and 8 months. 
 
Once the convictions had been secured, following guilty pleas, but unlike in Rogue Traders 
and Cowboy Builders, victims could not always be compensated for their financial losses 
(indeed Arthur had died before the offences were even investigated). In Rita’s case, for 
example, the financial investigation recovered only half the money that she had been 
defrauded of. It was not uncommon for offenders to be subject to only nominal £1 
compensation orders where no assets were found. Despite the best efforts of financial 
investigators like Barbara, it was suspected that some offenders were canny enough to hide 
their assets, although the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 means that this does not come without 
a cost. Hugh Harper had a hidden asset finding against him and the judge ruled an 
additional five year custodial sentence for not meeting the confiscation order requirements. 
While professionally satisfying, Barbara pondered: 
I sometimes wonder whether he's [Hugh Harper] got another property… he 
was using the account of his relative, a chap who was very helpfully called 
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Henry Harper so he could still continue to get cheques made out to H 
Harper. So I got an order on Henry Harper's account and I was able to find 
out that several cheques had been deposited into the account and they were 
followed by cash withdrawals…he'd ordered a wood-burning stove and 
had it delivered to an address and that address was owned outright by 
Henry Harper. So was that really owned by Hugh Harper but put in Henry 
Harper's name? We'll never know. 
Conclusion  
This article has sought to make visible a type of acquisitive crime about which little has been 
known empirically. It has not been possible to assess the extent of doorstep fraud using 
measures of prevalence and incidence, but it has been possible for the first time to provide a 
sense of the nature of this narrow form of fraud, which is itself not an offence that has been 
studied extensively in criminology. It involves a demographic group which crime surveys 
have repeatedly shown have the lowest risk of victimisation. Yet doorstep fraud usually 
involves the deliberate selection and targeting of older, usually vulnerable adults in their 
homes for bogus home repairs, often involving prolonged periods of repeated victimization. 
Sentimental imagery evinced of cheeky, roguish characters is quickly dispelled in such cases. 
Yet while doorstep offenders are as unlikely to be found on police stations’ bulletin boards 
of the Most Wanted or Top Nominals as they are on the BBC’s Rogue Traders website of 
mugshots, organized crime groups may, on occasion, be involved as Operation Topaz 
clearly indicated.  
 
Incidents like those against Rita could be considered ‘petty events’ because they involved 
low-value financial harms, but the degree of vulnerability of victims decry this type of 
labelling. Furthermore, as zemiologists Hillyard and Tombs (2007) have convincingly 
argued, crime needs to be placed within the context of other harmful events10, of relevance 
to human wellbeing and broader social policies rather than just criminal justice objectives. 
The vulnerabilities which may make certain individuals susceptible to doorstep fraud have 
far wider implications for safeguarding and care. These raise difficult questions about how 
we manage social care and the nature of extended family dynamics in late modern society, 
not least when we acknowledge that some victims, such as Maurice, without family, may 
welcome offenders’ coercive and destructive intrusion into their lives, if only because it 
alleviates chronic loneliness.   
 
There is, of course, much more to learn about doorstep fraud. An offender’s perspective is 
entirely missing from this account, and importantly this might shed light on ‘target 
selection’ decision-making processes which may assist in crime prevention, as well as telling 
us more about informal mechanisms of social control which may constrain offenders. Future 
research, analyzing the role of political economy, inequality, as well as culture, morality, and 
social trends will help to situate and contextualise offenders’ motivations, neutralisations, 
and criminal actions in an holistic way.   
A further contribution of the paper has been to provide a partial insight into the 
investigative work of trading standards officers, who have yet to feature in empirical 
research by policing scholars. This will be a fruitful area for future research, to both 
delineate the overlaps and dissimilarities in the occupational cultures and core activities of 
trading standards officers and police officers, but also to explore their revisioned role amidst 
                                                     
10 As yet little attention has been paid to examining the psychological and financial harms caused by 
fraud (Levi & Burrows, 2008). 
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an ideological climate of anti-regulation and severe cuts to enforcement possibilities 
resulting from the austerity agenda (Tombs 2016).   
 
References 
BIGGS, S., MANTHORPE, J., TINKER, A., DOYLE, M. & ERENS, B. (2009), 'Mistreatment of 
Older People in the United Kingdom: Findings from the First National 
Prevalence Study'. Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect 21/1: 1-14. 
BOTTOMS, A., E. & VON HIRSCH, A. (2010),'The Crime-Preventive Impact of Legal 
Sanctions'. in Cane, P. & Kritzer, H., M., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
Legal Research, 97-124, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BROGDEN, M. & NIJHAR, P. (2011), Crime, Abuse and the Elderly. Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing. 
BURGARD, A. & SCHLEMBACH, C. (2013), 'Frames of Fraud: A Qualitative Analysis of 
the Structure and Process of Victimization on the Internet'. International 
Journal of Cyber Criminology 7/2: 112-124. 
BURHOLT, V. & SCHARF, T. (2014), 'Poor Health and Loneliness in Later Life: The Role 
of Depressive Symptoms, Social Resources, and Rural Environments'. The 
Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 69/2: 
311-324. 
BUTTON, M. & JOHN, T. (2002), ''Plural Policing' in Action: A Review of the Policing of 
Environmental Prostests in England and Wales'. Policing & Society 12/2: 111. 
BUTTON, M., JOHNSTON, L., FRIMPONG, K. & SMITH, G. (2007), 'New Directions in 
Policing Fraud: The Emergence of the Counter Fraud Specialist in the United 
Kingdom'. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 35/4: 192-208. 
BUTTON, M., TAPLEY, J. & LEWIS, C. (2013), 'The ‘Fraud Justice Network’ and the Infra-
Structure of Support for Individual Fraud Victims in England and Wales'. 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 13/1: 37-61. 
COHEN, L. E. & FELSON, M. (1979), 'Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine 
Activity Approach'. American Sociological Review 44/4: 588-608. 
COLLIER, P. (2002), 'In Search of Purpose and Priorities: Police Perfornance Indicators 
in England and Wales'. Public Money and Management June: 165-172. 
COPES, H. & VIERAITIS, L. (2009), 'Bounded Rationality of Identity Thieves: Using 
Offender-Based Research to Inform Policy'. Criminology & Public Policy 8/2: 
237-262. 
COPES, H. & VIERAITIS, L. (2014),'Identity Theft: Assessing Offenders' Motivations and 
Strategies, Heith Copes and Lynne Vieraitis'. in Cromwell, P. & Birzer, M., L., 
eds., In Their Own Words: Criminals on Crime. Sixth Edition.124-139, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
16 
 
CORNISH, D. A. & CLARKE, R. V. (1986), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice 
Perspectives on Offending. New York, NY: Springer. 
DAVIES, P., FRANCIS, P. & WYATT, T. (2014),'Taking Invisible Crimes and Social Harms 
Seriously'. in Davies, P., Francis, P. & Wyatt, T., eds., Invisible Crimes and Social 
Harms, 1-25, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
DOIG, A. & LEVI, M. (2009), 'Inter-Agency Work and the Uk Public Sector 
Investigation of Fraud, 1996–2006: Joined-up Rhetoric and Disjointed Reality'. 
Policing and Society 19/3: 199-215. 
DUGATO, M., FAVARIN, S. & GIOMMONI, L. (2015), 'The Risks and Rewards of 
Organized Crime Investments in Real Estate'. British Journal of Criminology 
55/5: 944-965. 
EKBLOM, P. & TILLEY, N. (2000), 'Going Equipped: Criminology, Situational Crime 
Prevention, and the Resourceful Offender'. British Journal of Criminology 40/3: 
376-398. 
FALKINGHAM, J., EVANDROU, M., MCGOWAN, T., BELL, D. & BOWES, A. (2010), 
Demographic Issues, Projections and Trends: Older People with High Support Needs 
in the UK. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
FELSON, M. & BORA, R. (2010), Crime and Everday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
FITZGERALD, M., HOUGH, M., JOSEPH, I. & QURESHI, T. (2002), Policing for London. 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
FORRESTER, D., CHATTERTON, M., PEASE, K. & BROWN, R. (1988), The Kirkholt Burglary 
Prevention Project, Rochdale. London: Home Office. 
GILL, M. (2005),'Reducing the Capacity to Offender: Restricting Resources for 
Offending'. in Tilley, N., ed., Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community 
Safety, 306-328, Cullompton: Willan. 
GIORDANO, N. H. & GIORDANO, J. A. (1984), 'Elder Abuse: A Review of the Literature'. 
Social Work 29/3: 232-236. 
GODFREY, B. (2012),'11 Historical and Archival Research Methods. The Sage 
Handbook of Criminological Research Methods. Sage Publications Ltd'. in 
Gadd, D., Karstedt, S. & Messner, S., F., , eds., The Sage Handbook of 
Criminological Research Methods. 159-175, London: SAGE Publications. 
GORDEN, C. & BUCHANAN, J. (2013), 'A Systematic Literature Review of Doorstep 
Crime: Are the Crime-Prevention Strategies More Harmful Than the Crime?'. 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 52/3: 498-515. 
HILLYARD, P. & TOMBS, S. (2007), 'From ‘Crime’ to Social Harm?'. Crime Law and Social 
Change 48/1/2: 9-25. 
17 
 
HOUGH, M., FARRALL, S. & MCNEILL, F. (2013), Intelligent Justice: Balancing the Effects of 
Community Sentences and Custody. London: Howard League for Penal Reform. 
HUTTER, B. (1988), The Reasonable Arm of the Law? The Law Enforcement Procedures of 
Environmental Health Officers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
INNES, M. (2007),'Investigation Order and Major Crime Inquiries'. in Newburn, T., 
Williamson, T. & Wright, A., eds., Handbook of Criminal Investigation, 255-276, 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
JOHNSTON, L. (1992), The Rebirth of Private Policing. London: Routledge. 
JONES, T. & NEWBURN, T. (1998), Private Security and Public Policing. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
JONES, T. & NEWBURN, T. (2006),'The United Kingdom'. in Jones, T. & Newburn, T., 
eds., Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective, 34-54, Abingdon: Routledge. 
LADER, D., SHORT, S. & GERSHUNY, J. (2006), The Time Use Survey, 2005. London: 
National Statistics. 
LAYCOCK, G. (2003), Launching Crime Science. London: Jill Dando Institute of Crime 
Science. 
LEVI, M. (2008a), 'Organized Fraud and Organizing Frauds: Unpacking Research on 
Networks and Organization'. Criminology & Criminal Justice: 8/4: 389-419. 
LEVI, M. (2008b),'Policing Fraud and Organised Crime'. in Newburn, T., ed., 
Handbook of Policing. Second Edition, 522-552, Cullompton: Willan Publiishing. 
LEVI, M. & BURROWS, J. (2008), 'Measuring the Impact of Fraud in the Uk'. British 
Journal of Criminology 48/3: 293-318. 
MAGUIRE, M. (2003),'Criminal Investigation and Crime Control'. in Newburn, T., ed., 
Handbook of Policing, 363-393, Cullompton: Willan Publiishing. 
MCCONVILLE, M., SANDERS, A. & LENG, R. (1991), The Case for the Prosecution: Police 
Suspects and the Constructions of Criminality. London: Routledge. 
MCKEE, C. (2014), Crime Outcomes 2013/14. London: Home Office. 
MORSELLI, C. & ROY, J. (2008), 'Brokerage Qualifications in Ringing Operations*'. 
Criminology 46/1: 71-98. 
NEWBURN, T., WILLIAMSON, T. & WRIGHT, A. (2007),'Forsensic Techniques: 
Introduction'. in Newburn, T., Williamson, T. & Wright, A., eds., Handbook of 
Criminal Investigation, 299-301, Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
18 
 
ONS (2015) 'Table A5: Fraud Offences Recorded by Action Fraud, Year Ending 
March 2015', Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending March 2015. Available at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/year-ending-
march-2015/stb-crime-march-2015.html#tab-Fraud), London: ONS. 
PAYNE, B., K. (2011), Crime and Elder Abuse: An Integrated Perspective. 3rd Ed. . 
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, LTD. 
POLK, K. (1994), When Men Kill : Scenarios of Masculine Violence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
PRINCE, M., KNAPP, M., GUERCHET, M., MCCRONE, P., PRINA, M., COMAS-HERRERA, A., 
WITTENBERG, R., ADELAJA, B., HU, B., KING, D., REHILL, A. & SALIMKUMAR, D. 
(2014), Dementia UK. Update. London: Alzheimer’s Society. 
RAINE, J., MANGAN, C. & WATT, P. (2015), The Impact of Local Authority Trading 
Standards in Challenging Times. London: Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills and The Trading Standards Institute. 
REINER, R. (2000), 'Crime and Control in Britain'. Sociology 34/1: 71-94. 
SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY (2013), UKHTC: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT ON THE 
NATURE AND SCALE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN 2012 LONDON: SOCA. 
SHOVER, N. & HONAKER, D. (2014),'The Socially Bounded Decion Making of 
Persistent Property Offenders'. in Cromwell, P. & Birzer, M., L., eds., In Their 
Own Words: Criminals on Crime. Sixth Edition.35-51, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
SOUTH, N. (2014),'Foreword'. in Davies, P., Francis, P. & Wyatt, T., eds., Invisible 
Crimes and Social Harms, vii-viii, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
STEELE, B., THORNTON, A., MCKILLOP, C. & DOVER, H. (2001), The Formulation of a 
Strategy to Prevent and Detect Distraction Burglary Offences against Older People. 
London: Home Office. 
SUTTON, M. (2007),'Improving National Crime Surveys: With a Focus Upon Strangely 
Neglected Offenders and Their Offenses, Including Fraud, High-Tech Crimes, 
and Handling Stolen Goods'. in Hough, M. & Maxfield, M., eds., Surveying 
Crime in the 21st Century, 243-261, Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
TAYLOR, E. (2014), 'Honour among Thieves? How Morality and Rationality Influence 
the Decision-Making Processes of Convicted Domestic Burglars'. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 14/4: 487-502. 
THORNTON, A., HATTON, C., RALPH, L. & OWEN, T. (2005), 'Understanding the Older 
Person's Awareness and Experience of Doorstep Crime: Results of a National 
Survey'. Crime Prevention & Community Safety 7/1: 31-42. 
19 
 
TOMBS, S. (2016), Social Protection after the Crisis : Regulation without Enforcement. 
Bristol, UK : Policy Press. 
VAGG, J. (1995), 'The Policing of Signs: Trademark Infringment and Law 
Enforcement'. European Journal on Criminal Policy & Research 3/2: 75-91. 
VAUGHAN, D. & CARLO, G. (1975), 'The Appliance Repairman: A Study of Victim-
Responsiveness and Fraud'. Journal Of Research In Crime & Delinquency 12/2: 
153-161. 
WALKLATE, S. (2007), Imagining the Victim of Crime. Maidenhead: Open University 
Press. 
YOUNG, J. (1994),'Incessant Chatter: Recent Paradigms in Criminology'. in Maguire, 
M., Morgan, R. & Reiner, R., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 69-124, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Funding 
This work was supported by the National Trading Standards Board and LSE’s Suntory and 
Toyota’s International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research would not have been undertaken without the gentle chiding of Professor Ken 
Pease OBE for more than twenty years! I am immensely grateful to him, Dr Martha J. Smith, 
Professor Tim Newburn, Professor Steve Tombs, and Dr Rod Earle for their guidance and 
insightful critique of an earlier draft of this paper. I wish to also thank the reviewers' for 
their comments. 
 
 
  
20 
 
TABLE 1 
DETAILS OF BOGUS AND INFLATED CHARGES FOR REPAIR WORK (ARTHUR) 
Surveyor's Report Victim's Cheque Stubs 
 Power washing of drive 
 1 coat of bitumen to the garage roof 
 1 coat of bitumen to the shed roof 
 Replacement of two roof tiles 
 50% new solar chippings to the garage roof 
 New squareline gutter to the garage 
 New squareline rainwater pipe to the garage 
 New uPVC fascia to rear of garage 
 Repair timber shiplap cladding above rear patio doors 
 Redecoration of stained cladding to front and rear 
elevations, rear side gate / fence and parts of garage 
 1 coat of gloss paint (no undercoat) to garage doors, garage 
windows & garage side door frame 
 2 coats of stain to the garden fence panels (one side only) 
 Patch lounge ceiling & 4 square metres painting 
 
19/6/09, £450 – “Gardening” 
23/6/09, £170 – “Drive clean” 
10/7/09, £350 – “Painting” 
22/10/09,  £200 – “Drive cleaned” 
17/11/09, , £550 – “Roof repairs” 
28/1/10, £1200 – “House repairs” 
23/2/10, £1800 – “House repairs” 
6/3/10, £160 – “House repairs” 
22/4/10, £950 – “Repairs to roof” 
20/5/10, £1400 – “Repairs” 
16/6/10, £450 – “Repairs” 
8/7/10, £900 – “Repairs” 
26/7/10, £500 – “Repairs” 
23/8/10, £400 – “Repairs” 
30/9/10, £500 – “Gardening” 
11/1/11, £900 – “Repairs” 
3/3/11, £700 – “House repairs” 
29/4/11, £800 – "Blank" 
23/5/11, £600 – "Blank" 
31/5/11, £600 –"Blank" 
7/7/11, £700 – "Blank" 
9/8/11, £700 – “Painting” 
29/8/11, £1250 – "Blank" 
24/9/11, £1200 – "Blank" 
Surveyor's valuation of the work £1,704 Victim charged £17,430 (cheques only) 
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TABLE 2 LIST OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS FOR OPERATION TOPAZ 
Witnesses No. 
Offender  interviews, master tapes/transcripts, video identification 89 
Victim statements, video interviews and assessments 4 
Victim diary entries and other handwritten notes (inc. by offenders) 34 
Officers’ pocketbooks, other correspondence, ID parade documents 26 
For Court attendance (n=414):  
Victims 110 Police officers 184 Trading Standards officers and 
Financial Investigators 
18 
Bank staff 8 Friends/family 27 Forensic analysts 12 
Experts1 13 Neighbours 15 Business/other2 27 
Physical Materials  
Victim cheques/chequebook stubs 133 
Photos (sets)/maps of victims' properties and sites 118 
Phone and satnav record analysis 108 
CCTV stills, footage DVDs from police team, photos of vehicles used 79 
Handwriting analysis (e.g. flyer, invoice, etc.) 77 
Garden tools, light bulbs, shade - taken from victims' homes, etc. 64 
Receipts, invoices, notes (inc. some handwritten), business cards 36 
Forensic swabs from seized vehicle, cigarette stubs, etc. 23 
Fingerprints on flyers, vehicle, etc. 9 
Cash (and video of counting) 16 
Crime scene report diagram 1 
Intelligence and Other Information  
Trader flyers (for gardening services under different business names) 62 
Mobile phones, storage cards, camera, laptop, and GPS systems 58 
Bank statements/accounts (victim) 20 
Benefits and tax (DWP and HMRC) correspondence, insolvency applications 21 
Independent surveyor's/aboriculturist's report 5 
Historic correspondence between Trading Standards and offenders 3 
Offenders' and Suspects' Possessions  
Bank statements, chequebooks, cash receipt book, correspondence 91 
Vehicle documents, keys, hire agreements 45 
Porcelain, wine goblets, ornaments, jewellery (inc. Rolex watches) 36 
Retail receipts 33 
Clothing e.g. sweat-/T-shirt with business name inscribed on them 18 
Trade materials (or digital images of) 6 
Magnetic van signs with business name on 5 
Diary 6 
Knuckle duster (metal weapon for hand combat) 1 
Miscellaneous 32 
Notes: 
1. Including surveyor, aboriculturist, GP, other, etc. 
2. Including car sales and rental staff, CCTV operators, and phone data analysts. 
 
 
 
